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question the propriety of service authorized by a court under
308(4). In the latter case the interests of the defendant and his
carrier conflict and denial to question the propriety of service under
308(4) may substantially affect the carrier's rights adversely.
CPLR 321: Insurance counsel not permitted to effectuate
a disclaimer by withdrawal.
In Bialyrv. Reeber,41 the court denied a motion to withdraw
made by defendant's counsel. The attorney had been retained by
defendant's insurance company to defend him. Prior to this motion
the insurance company had attempted to disclaim for lack of cooperation on defendant's part because he gave two conflicting versions of the accident. 42 Nevertheless the carrier was then held to
be under a duty to defend. An exhaustive and diligent search having been made in an effort to locate the defendant, counsel predicated his motion to withdraw on the necessity of presence of
the defendant at the trial.
The court conceded that the insurer might have grounds for
a valid disclaimer but was unwilling to allow defendant's attorney
tp withdraw and thus use this as a "device to obtain or ratify a
disclaimer-in-fact."
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Generally, the courts require a plenary action

for a declaratory judgment as to the insurance carrier's coverage
liability.4.

An attorney "may terminate his relationship at any time for
a good and sufficient cause and upon reasonable notice." -s A good
cause is found where it appears that -the defendant and his insurance company are at odds, i.e., where the insurance company disclaims liability under the policy. To require the attorney in such
a case to represent the defendant would create a genuine conflict
of interest. However, since the courts place a heavy burden of
proof upon the insurer before liability may be disclaimed, 4 they
will not permit counsel by way of withdrawal to effectuate a disclaimer. For, while, in reality, the attorney represents the insurer,
his position is such that until
there is a disclaimer, he has certain
4 7
obligations to the insured.

4154 Misc. 2d 773, 283 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1967).

42 "On the trial of the disclaimer action [defendant] gave several other
versions and was characterized then . . . as an incredible witness-absolutely
unworthy of belief." Id. at 774, 283 N.Y.S2d at 452.
431d. at 775, 283 N.Y.S2d at 452.
4 Ganas v. Terry, 16 App. Div.' 2d 826, 228 N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't
1962) (mem.); Brooks v. City of New York, 1 Misc. 2d 740, 149 N.Y.S.2d
592 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956).
45 I
re Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 403, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (1912).
46 Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d
503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967); Amatucci v. Maryland Cas. Co., 25 App.
Div. 2d 583, 267 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1966) (Per curiam).
4a Bialy v. Reeber, 54 Misc. 2d 773, 775, 283 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (Sup.
Ct Suffolk County 1967).

